tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post114738102808401070..comments2014-01-12T10:46:48.153-07:00Comments on The Geomblog: Behavioral computing and airline loading...Suresh Venkatasubramanianhttps://plus.google.com/112165457714968997350noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post-1148366723373999612006-05-23T00:45:00.000-06:002006-05-23T00:45:00.000-06:00Methinks that the number of items of carryon lugga...Methinks that the number of items of carryon luggage should<BR/>be the prime determinant of seat allocation and boarding time.<BR/>Greedy algorithm that encourages people to travel light so<BR/>that they can board quicker with less hassle and get first<BR/>dibs on good seats. <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A><A HREF="http://geomblog.blogspot.com/2006/05/behavioral-computing-and-airline.html#comments" REL="nofollow" TITLE="moo at fanchu dot com">Moo Fanchu</A>Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post-1147664309133703502006-05-14T21:38:00.000-06:002006-05-14T21:38:00.000-06:00The problem I have with game theory is that it ass...The problem I have with game theory is that it assumes "rational" agents. <BR/><BR/>I'm trying to make money off peoples irrationality. And "optimal solutions" and "Nash equilibria" don't always help, because sometimes, but not always, they don't offer any help in exploiting mistakes of the opponent to the fullest potential. It's like "Ok, I've made all I've expected to make in this situation, now I'm going to give up and be a moron."<BR/> <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>AnonymousAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post-1147650989851674272006-05-14T17:56:00.000-06:002006-05-14T17:56:00.000-06:00Andy: that is true. if one postulates certain mode...Andy: that is true. if one postulates certain models of human behaviour (rational agents, limited knowledge agents etc), then one definitely inherits the formal frameworks that you mentioned above.  <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>SureshSureshhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15898357513326041822noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post-1147642559632638732006-05-14T15:35:00.000-06:002006-05-14T15:35:00.000-06:00"no n^2 time algorithms or NP-hardness results"But..."no n^2 time algorithms or NP-hardness results"<BR/><BR/>But there are impossibility results for constrained design of distributed game-theoretic environments. We can encounter any and all of the failure models from: distributed comuting (deadlock, etc.), game theory (suboptimal equilibria), complexity theory (hard-to-find equilibria, intractible-to-design optimal game environments), maybe more. What's less clear to me is how much satisfying unification (a la NP-completeness) the hard/impossible problems of this area exhibit, and whether the difficulties can be cleanly and exhaustively described by something like the above list.<BR/><BR/>Auction design is among the more well-established problems in this area, and Noam Nisan's and Tuomas Sandholm's work (among others) approach it from interesting CS angles. <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>Andy DAndy Dhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/03897281159810085972noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6555947.post-1147534060719030622006-05-13T09:27:00.000-06:002006-05-13T09:27:00.000-06:00This is probably related to the field of "pedestri...This is probably related to the field of "pedestrian dynamics", which models pedestrian behavior in public areas, especially in <A HREF="http://angel.elte.hu/panic/" REL="nofollow">panic situations</A> . Pedestrians are modeled as goal seeking, and subject to forces both physical and social. In a panicky rush to a room exit, there is a phenomenen of "arching", in which a small ring of people, pushing against other to get out, forms a rough arch, so that none can escape. I suppose this is a Nash, as well as a physical, equilibrium.<BR/><BR/>There is also the area of traffic engineering, which also features a distributed set of goal-seeking agents.<BR/><BR/>-Ken <BR/><BR/><A></A><A></A>Posted by<A><B> </B></A>Ken ClarksonAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com